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I 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THOMAS C. MABEY and LOUISE S. 
MABEY, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
WASATCH CABINET COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
KAY PETERSON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., a Utah corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Case No. 18338 
The brief of the Respondents (Plaintiffs Thomas C. and Louise S. Mabey) 
raises for the first time on appeal issues which are beyond the scope of 
the brief of Appellant (Defendant Kay Peterson Construction Company, Inc.) 
and which, it is submitted, Plaintiffs Mabey are not entitled to have heard 
by this court. In order to address these newly-raised issues and direct 
the court's attention to the errors in Plaintiffs Mabey's arguments, Defend-
ant Kay Peterson Construction respectfully submits this brief in reply. 
For convenience and to maintain consistent terminology between this reply 
brief and Defendant's previous brief, the parties will be referred to 
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throughout as "Plaintiffs" or 11 Mabeys 11 and 11 Defendant 11 or "Kay Peterson 
Construction." 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
HAVING FAILED EITHER TO APPEAL OR CROSS-APPEAL, 
PLAINTIFFS (AS RESPONDENTS ON APPEAL) ARE 
NOW PRECLUDED FROM ARGUING FOR AND ARE NOT ENTITLED TO 
A REVERSAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OF MUTUAL MISTAKE 
At the close of trial, the trial court correctly and properly found, 
.based upon the ev~dence presented, that there had been a mutual mistake in 
the formation of the contract which was the subject of the litigation 
between the parties. Notwithstanding this finding (and as pointed out at 
some length in Defendant's previous brief on appeal at Point I) the trial 
judge erroneously failed to reform the contract and elected instead to 
ignore the evidence presented to the court and award damages to both 
parties based upon amounts prayed for in the pleadings. An appeal was 
properly and timely filed by the Defendant Kay.Peterson Construction. No 
appeal or cross-appeal was or has been filed by the Plaintiffs Mabey. 
Nevertheless, the Plaintiffs have utilized the major portion of their 
Respondent's Brief to argue that the trial court erred in finding a mutual 
mistake and in granting judgment to the Defendant. Moreover, Plaintiffs 
have specifically indicated in their brief under the paragraph captioned 
"Relief Sought on Appeal" that they "seek reversal of the court's judg-
ment in favor of Defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact 
• 
11 (Resp. Br. at 3) . 
It is the clear rule of law in Utah, as supported by numerous 
decisions of this Court, that a party who seeks any relief on appeal 
other than mere affirmation of the lower court judgment must present to 
- 3 -
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this Court an appeal or cross-appeal designating that portion of the judg-
ment w hi ch i s a p pea 1 e d fr om and the re 1 i e f requested . Ru 1 e 7 4 ( b ) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when one party files a notice 
of appeal, other parties may cross-appeal without filing a notice of 
appeal; however: 
"such [other] party or parties shall file a statement of the 
points on which he intends to rely on such cross-appeal 
within the time and as required by subdivision (d) of Rule 
75. II 
Rule 75(d) provides in pertinent part: 
"If the respondent desires to cross-appeal, or if the 
appellant has filed a statement of the points on which 
he intends to rely and the respondent desires to have 
the appellate court consider other or additional matters, 
the respondent shall, within ten days after the service 
and filing of appellant's designation, or if the parties 
stipulate as to the record on appeal, within ten days from 
the filing of such stipulation, serve and file a statement 
of respondent's points, either by way of such cross-appeal 
or for the purpose of having considered other or additional 
matters than those raised by appellant." (Emphasis added.) 
The failure of a respondent on appeal to file properly or timely a 
cross-appeal results in waiver of the respondent's right to have the court 
review or modify the trial court judgment. In Terry vs. Zions Cooperative 
Merchantile Institution, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980), this court considered 
on rehearing the issue of whether a respondent on appeal is entitled to 
affirmative relief when no valid cross-appeal exists. The plaintiff in 
that case, Mrs. Terry, had obtained a judgment against the defendant, 
Z.C.M.I., for damages resulting from false arrest and malicious prosecution. 
The jury award of $15,000.00 punitive damages was reduced by the trial 
judge to $2,000.00 and judgment was entered accordingly. The defendant 
- 4 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
appealed from the lower court judgmen~ against it and on appeal this court 
reinstated the entire punitive damage award of $15,000.00. On petition 
for rehearing the defendant pointed out that the plaintiff was not entitled 
to reinstatement of the punitive damage award, because the plaintiff had 
not filed a valid cross-appeal from the lower court's judgment reducing 
the award to $2,000.00. (Plaintiff had untimely filed a cross-appeal, but 
had withdrawn the same after a motion to dismiss the cross-appeal was 
made by the defendant.) 
The plaintiff presented two arguments to this Court in response to 
the defendant's claim that plaintiff was not entitled to have the punitive 
damage award increased: 
1. Plaintiff could either cross-appeal or request the court in her 
respondent's brief to reinstate the original amount of the verdict; and 
2. Because the defendant had appealed from the entire judgment, 
including the award of punitive damages, plaintiff could address the entire 
subject matter of the appeal without the necessity of a cross-appeal. 
This court reviewed the plaintiff's contentions and rejected them 
both holding: 
"If he [the appellee] wishes to argue for alteration of the 
judgment to enlarge his rights, he must file his own notice 
of appeal or petition within the time provided by the rules, 
i.e., in the usual parlance, he must file a cross-appeal or 
cross-petition .... 
What the plaintiff sought was to increase the punitive damages, 
which thus constituted a request for an affirmative change 
of the judgment for her benefit . . . . 11 Supra at 702 (em-
phasis by the court). 
As a consequence of this holding the court reversed its order reinstating 
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the entire punitive damage award and merely reaffirmed the trial court's 
prior judgment. 
The ruling in Terry that a respondent on appeal may not seek to 
enlarge his own rights without first filing a cross-appeal, follows sub-
stantial precedent set in earlier Utah decisions. In Hartford Accident 
and Indemnity Company vs. Clegg, 103 Utah 414, 135 P.2d 919 (1943), this Court 
refused to review assignments of error raised by the respondent who had 
failed to file a cross-appeal, stating: 
"No affirmative relief can be granted to respondent, even if 
he were entitled to such, because no cross-appeal has been 
filed. 11 103 Utah at 427 (emphasis added). 
In his concurring opinion in Jensen vs. Freeman Gulch Mining Company, 
109 Utah 163, 166 P.2d 250 (1946), Justice Wolfe observed that even though 
the lower court judgment in favor of the plaintiff-appellant was unsupport-
able, it would be affirmed on appeal because the defendant had not filed 
a cross-appeal (109 Utah at 171). Compare also Peterson vs. Peterson, 112 
Utah 554, 190 P.2d 135 (1948), and Reimann vs. Baum, 115 Utah 147, 203 
P.2d 387 (1949), wherein this court refused to hear issues not properly 
raised by cross-appeal. 
There can be no doubt that Utah law imposes upon a respondent to 
an appeal the responsibility to raise by cross-appeal any issue which will 
result in affirmative relief or enlargement of rights on behalf of the 
respondent. If there is no cross-appeal, a respondent may only seek 
affirmation of the lower court judgment. The Utah rule requiring cross-
appeals is neither unusual nor extraordinary. In fact, similar, if not 
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identical, positions have been taken by the appellate courts in every 
neighboring jurisdiction. 
In Booras vs. Uyeda, 56 Ore.App. 834, 643 P.2d 413 (1982) the Oregon 
appeals court had before it an appeal by the plaintiff from a lower court 
judgment of money damages. The plaintiff had brought an action in equity 
against the defendant for specific performance on a contract. The trial 
court had found the contract to be valid and enforceable, but denied specific 
performance on the ground it was "impractical, difficult and time consuming." 
The plaintiff appealed from the damage award demanding that he be granted 
specific performance on the contract instead. No cross-appeal was filed 
by the defendants; however, on appeal the defendants argued that the trial 
court erred in finding the contract specifically enforceable because the 
plaintiff had failed to prove a legally enforceable contract. The plain-
tiff pointed out that the defendants could not challenge the court's 
finding without having first cross-appealed. In acce~ting the plaintiff's 
contention and rejecting the defendants' argument, the court noted: 
"It is well settled that, although this court reviews a case 
in equity de novo, a respondent who has not cross-appealed 
cannot obtain here a judgment more favorable to him and less 
favorable to the appellant than the judgment entered below 
(citing cases)." 643 P.2d at 413 
In Maricopa County vs. Corporate Commission of Arizona, 79 Ariz. 307, 
289 P.2d 183 (1955) the appellee attempted in its brief to attack the lower 
court judgment without having filed a cross-appeal. The Arizona Supreme 
Court refused to consider the points raised by the appellee, holding 
instead that where an appellee seeks by cross assignments in its brief 
to attack a judgment with a view of either enlarging its own rights or 
- 7 -
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lessening the rights of its adversary, it must cross-appeal by conforming 
with rules of court and by giving notice of such cross-appeal. 289 P.2d 
at 185. 
As to additional jurisdictions, see: Lepel vs. Lepel, 93 Idaho 82, 456 
P.2d 249, 254 (1969) ("If a respondent, in an appeal, desires to have 
errors against himself corrected, he must present them to [the appellate] 
court by way of cross-appeal"); James vs. City of Pittsburg, 195 Kans. 
462, 407 P.2d 503, 505 (1965) ("[The successful party in the lower court 
is required] to file a cross-appeal before he can present adverse rulings 
for review"); Trollope vs. Koerner, 21 Ariz.App. 43, 515 P.2d 340, 343 
(1973) ( 11 [A]ppellants should not have recovered [any judgment] ... 
However, since no cross-appeal was taken by appellees, this Court is obliged 
to affirm the damage award as handed down by the trial court"); Chavira vs. 
Carnahan, 77 N.M. 467, 423 P.2d 988, 990 (1967) ("[A]ppellee has not filed 
a cross-appeal and any objection to the trial court's instructions can 
not be properly raised for consideration by way of his answer brief"); 
Board of County Commissioners of Arapahoe County vs. City and County of 
Denver, 547 P.2d 249, 251 (Colo. 1976) ("[A]n appellee may not attack a 
decree with a view either to enlarging his rights thereunder or lessening 
the rights of his adversary unless a cross-appeal has been filed 11 ); Tindle 
vs. Linville, 512 P.2d 176, 179 (Okla. 1973) ("Parties who fail to [cross-
appeal] are deemed to acquiesce in the judgment of the trial court. They 
cannot be heard, on appeal by others, to complain of errors below, and 
can demand no relief from the appellate tribunal"). 
The comments advanced by the courts in refusing to hear or rule on 
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issues not properly raised by cross-appeal offer clear support for the 
law in this jurisdiction; namely, a respondent who desires on appeal that 
the reviewing court act other than to affirm the lower court decision, must 
first file a cross-appeal, even if the lower court ruling is in error or 
unsupportable. This rule applied equally in equity cases where the facts 
are reviewed by the appellate court and in cases at law, and cannot be 
satisfied by merely raising arguments for the first time in the respondent's 
brief. Proper and timely filing of the pleadings and notices specified 
in Rule 74(b) and 75(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is a mandatory 
prerequisite to any claim by a respondent of error at the trial level. 
Turning to the position of the Plaintiffs Mabey in the present 
action as outlined in their respondents 1 brief, one notes 'that Plaintiffs 
have specifically requested "reversal of the court 1 s judgment in favor 
of defendant based upon an alleged mutual mistake of fact 11 (Resp. Br. at 
3) and that Plaintiffs have argued at some length (Point III; Resp. Br. 
at 14 through 26) for such reversal, claiming the trial court erred in finding 
mutual mistake. A thorough review of the file and an examination of 
the court docket indicates that not only have Plaintiffs failed to file 
a timely or adequate cross-appeal, they have failed to file any sort 
of cross-appeal at all! It is obvious from their arguments against the 
finding of mutual mistake, that Plaintiffs are requesting this court 
to grant relief on appeal which, if granted, would enlarge their own 
rights or lessen those of the Defendant Kay Peterson Construction. Plain-
tiffs, due to their failure to cross-appeal, are not entitled to such 
- 9 -
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relief, nor are they even entitled to a review of their claims or argu-
ments. This court should refuse to consider Plaintiffs 1 arguments against 
mutual mistake, and should instead reform the contract to reflect the 
intention of the parties, as the trial court failed to do. 
With respect to the question of reform~tion, one final observation is 
pertinent. Plaintiffs have nowhere in their brief disputed or indicated 
any opposition to the arguments advanced by the Defendant that the trial 
court erred when it failed to reform the contract to the parties• under-
standing. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not disputed in their brief Defendant's 
contention that the proper remedy upon a finding of mutual mistake of 
fact is reformation of the contract to reflect the intention of the parties. 
Plaintiffs offer no legal authority or argument in their brief in support 
of the trial court's award of damages both to the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
in total disregard to the obvious consequences of the mutual mistake. In 
fact, having found mutual mistake in the formation of the contract, the 
trial court's judgment thereon is totally unsupportable in the law. 
Reformation of the contract is the proper remedy and judgment should be 
entered by this Court accordingly. 
- 10 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY AND PROPERLY FOUND 
THAT THERE WAS A MUTUAL MISTAKE OF FACT 
IN THE FORMATION OF THE WRITTEN CONTRACT 
While it is the firm belief of the Defendant that the question of 
whether the trial court erred in finding mutual mistake is not properly 
before this Court, Defendant finds itself compelled nevertheless to respond 
to the erroneous and misleading arguments advanced by the Plaintiffs in 
their brief. Contrary to the assertions of Plaintiffs, the evidence pre-
sented at trial not only clearly and convincingly establishes the mutual 
mistake of the parties in the formation of the written contract, it stands 
unopposed in support of that determination. There is no contradictory 
evidence in the record. 
Plaintiffs have in the Respondents' Brief argued all around the 
court's holding of mutual mistake, without ever addressing the issue 
directly. Plaintiffs have attempted to claim the issue was not properly 
before the court (Resp. Br. Point III A, at 14-16). They have argued that 
the mistake was not "mutual" (Resp. Br. Point III B, at 16-17). They have 
alleged there was insufficient evidence of a mutual mistake (Resp. Br. Point 
III C, at 18-20). Finally they have claimed there was no mistake at all 
(Resp. Br. Point III D, at 20-23). None of Plaintiffs' arguments address 
the obvious conclusion reached by the trial judge from the clear and 
undisputed testimony given by both the Plaintiff, Mr. Mabey, and Defendant's 
President, Kay Peterson; namely that the parties intended to enter into 
a contract which would set forth the purchase price only of the improvements 
on Lot 1, not of the lot itself (Plaintiff Mabey's testimony, T60-62; 
- 11 -
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Defendant Peterson's testimony, T116-117). The written contract in the 
form of the Earnest Money Agreement (Pl. Ex. C) with the adjusted price 
term did not, as a result of the mutual mistake of the parties, reflect 
that intention. 
Defendant in its previous brief and Plaintiffs in their brief have 
both referred to the rule in Jensen vs. Manilla Corporation of the Church 
of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 565 P.2d 63 (Utah 1977), which states 
that a written instrument which fails to conform to what the parties intended 
may be reformed by the court to reflect that intention. Notwithstanding 
the fact that Defendant in its previous brief meticulously and carefully 
explained how the evidence at trial established the parties' intentions 
(App. Br. A and Bat 14, 15), Plaintiffs have claimed in their brief that 
Defendant failed to show what the parties intended. In support of this 
proposition Plaintiffs make the remarkable claim that the record does 
not reflect the Plaintiffs' intention to pay $127,000.00 for the house 
and improvements. Admittedly the figure of $127,000.00 is an extrapolation 
from the evidence presented to the court; however, the existence or non-
existence of that number in the evidence does not alter the real intentions 
of the parties. The record is replete with testimony establishing that 
the contracting parties intended the purchase price to be whatever the 
total construction cost of the home and the improvements was, less any 
amounts attributable to the lot itself. The uncontradicted, undisputed 
evidence, in the form of the testimony of both Plaintiff Tom Mabey and 
Defendant's President, Kay Peterson, confirms that: 
- l? -
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1. The reduction in the original purchase price of $134,068.40 (which 
price was agreed to on March 20, 1980) (Pl. Ex. C) was made because both 
parties believed that figure included the full price of the lot ($27,000.00) 
as well as the cost of the improvements. 
2. The reduced price of $109,000.00 was intended by the parties to 
reflect the deletion of the total lot price (in the form of two payoff 
amounts, $18,000.00 and $9,000.00) thought to be included in the $134,068.40 
figure. 
3. In fact only the $9,000.00 lot payoff amount was included in the 
$134,068.40. 
4. Had the contract actually reflected the parties' intention, the 
purchase price of $134s068.40 (plus an approximate $2,000.00 increase 
added by Tom Mabey as a 11 buffer 11 ) would have only been reduced by $9,000.00 
instead of $27,000.00 as the parties actually proceeded to do. 
The inescapable conclusion is: the parties both intended the price 
figure of the contract to evidence the cost of the home and improvements 
only, and the reduced price figure on the contract of $109,000.00 did not 
reflect that intention; it was $18,000.00 too low. 
A clearer example of "mutual mistake" would be hard to find. Jensen 
vs. Manilla Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 
supra. The mutual mistake was obvious to the trial judge. It is obvious 
from the record. Only the Plaintiffs appear confused on this issue. The 
trial court's finding should not be disturbed on appeal. 
- 11 -
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POINT I I I. 
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESENT AT TRIAL 
ANY PROBATIVE EVIDENCE SUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH 
A BASIS FOR AN AWARD OF DAMAGES 
RESULTING FROM ALLEGED DEFECTIVE WORKMANSHIP 
In Defendant's prior brief on appeal, Defendant pointed out that the 
Plaintiffs had failed at trial to present any evidence on which an amount 
for claimed damages resulting from alleged defective workmanship could 
be established "with reasonably certainty." Plaintiffs have argued in 
the Respondents 1 Brief that the evidence presented concerning the amount 
of damages (testimony of Mr. Mabey) was competent and credible, hence it 
was also sufficient and reasonably certain (Resp. Br. Point I at 7-11). 
Through such falacious reasoning Plaintiffs seek to perpetuate here the 
error made by the trial court, which in awarding damages based on Mr. 
Mabey•s testimony, apparently relied on what it viewed as "competent" 
evidence to establish factual conclusions which must be based on "probative" 
evidence. The failure of Plaintiffs to grasp the distinction between 
competent and probative evidence, both at trial and in their brief on 
appeal, raises some concern that Plaintiffs' confusion may cloud this 
Court's review of this matter. The following discussion of the law is 
presented with a view to clarifying the misconceptions which Plaintiffs 
have attempted to propound. 
Plaintiffs have correctly cited in their brief the rule on "reasonable 
certainty" of damages stated by this Court in Security Development Company 
vs. Fedco, 23 Utah 2d 306, 462 P.2d 706 (1969). However, it is apparent 
from a review of Plaintiffs' arguments that Plaintiffs have not only 
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misunderstood the rule they cite, they have misapplied it as well. Para-
phrasing the damage rule of Security Development, supra, it becomes: a 
damage amount need not be determined exactly, provided a reasonable basis 
for calculation of the damage amount is afforded from the evidence. As to 
what constitutes a "reasonable basis for calculation," this Court in 
Security Development referred with approval to the explanation offered by 
the United States Supreme Court in Lavender vs. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 
740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1945). That court in discussing jury determinations of 
damages and the evidence necessary to support such verdicts noted: 
"Only when there is a complete absence of probative facts 
to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error 
appear . 11 3 2 7 U .S . at 6 5 3 ( em p has i s added ) . 
In other words, even though the rule of certainty in damage awards allows 
the amount of an award to be"approximate" or "inexact," it must ne.vertheless 
be supported by "probative" evidence. 
The concept of "probative" facts (as distinguished from "ultimate" 
facts) and the concept of "probative" evidence as opposed to "reliable or 
competent" evidence have been thoroughly explored in numerous court 
opinions. From those court decisions the following definitions may be 
derived. Considering first "probative" facts, they are that part of the 
evidence from which ultimate and decisive facts may be inferred. Ultimate 
facts are those which the evidence (probative facts) proves at trial. 
Ultimate facts are not the same as the evidence (probative facts) required 
to prove those ultimate facts. Brown vs. Hall, 226 N.C. 732, 40 S.E.2d 412 
(1946); Daniel vs. Gardner, 240 N.C. 249, 81 S.E.2d 660 (1954). Stated 
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in another way, probative facts provide the basis from which the ultimate, 
decisive facts may be deduced or concluded; they are not the ultimate facts 
themselves. 
Turning to the term 11 probative 11 as it is applied to evidence, the 
courts have offered the following explanations. 
"[Probative evidence is] testimony of substance and relevant 
consequence not vague or uncertain ... ['probative'] has 
reference to the substance of the testimony generally and 
not the credibility of the witness. 11 Liquor Control Commision 
vs. Bartolas, 10 Ohio Misc. 225, 225 N.E.2d 859, 862 (1963) 
(emphasis added). 
"['Probative'] relates to the evidentiary value of the 
testimony and other evidence in an analytical sense, having 
depth and being more than merely superficial or speculative." 
Sowers vs. Ohio Civil Rights Commission, 20 Ohio Misc. 115, 
252 N.E.2d 463, 478 (1969). 
The term "probative," therefore, as applied to evidence refers to the 
adequacy or sufficiency of the evidence to support the ultimate factual 
conclusion to be established. 
Applying the concepts of "probative" facts and evidence to the rule 
that damages may be approximate or inexact so long as there is a reasonable 
basis for calculation thereof, it becomes clear that the rule really pro-
vides that the amount of damages is the "ultimate" fact which the finder 
of fact must determine or establish from the probative facts, i.e., those 
substantive parts of the evidence which establish a basis for calculating 
and thereby determining that ultimate damage amount. The need for 
substance and depth in the facts presented as a basis for the damage 
award, even when the award itself can only be approximate, is obvious 
from the rule itself. While the evidence must also be competent and 
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credible, if its lacks substance or is merely superficial, it cannot be 
"probative" and cannot support the ultimate fact in issue, namely the 
amount of damages to be determined. 
Analyzing the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs during the trial 
of this cause in the light of the foregoing discussion, it is apparent 
that Plaintiffs presented no probative evidence to the court at all. 
The testimony of the Plaintiff Tom Mabey, offered to establish the alleged 
damage amount, was couched in terms of the "ultimate" fact in issue only 
(T-34,35). Mr. Mabey testified that damages were "about $5,400.00. 11 
Plaintiffs presented~ probative facts, no evidence of substance, in 
support of that claim to damage amount and Plaintiffs provided no 
information or facts as a basis from which the damage amount could be 
calculated or inferred. Mr. Mabey did testify that his claimed damages 
were figured at "about $17.00 an hour," however no evidence was provided 
as to how the per hour rate related to the damage figure of $5,400.00. 
In other words, what the Plaintiffs provided to the court as "evidence" 
was the very factual conclusion (devoid of any supporting evidence) which 
the court should have reached from the probative evidence which was not 
provided. As the United States Supreme Court has stated, "absence of 
probative facts to support the conclusion reached [constitutes] reversible 
error." Lavender v. Kurn, supra at 653. 
The trial court assumably and the Plaintiffs (as indicated by the 
arguments in their brief on appeal) clearly failed to grasp and properly 
apply the legal principles described herein. Plaintiffs instead have 
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presumed that "competent" evidence is the same as "probative" evidence and 
have argued that if the evidence was competent, it must be sufficient. The 
definitions and discussions set forth herein clearly show the contradictory 
and illogical nature of that position. This court should not perpetuate 
the error of Plaintiffs and the trial court. The trial court's award of 
damages must be reversed as being unsupported by the evidence. 
One final observation should be made in connection with the issue 
of damages for faulty workmanship. The trial judge, in ruling for Plain-
tiffs on this issue, added the stipulation that the judgment in favor of 
the Plaintiffs would be set aside if the Defendant satisfied the State 
[Board of Contractors] relative to repairing the alleged defects "within 
one month" (T-132). The judge allowed that such an order could 11 complicate" 
things, however his apparent intention in awarding such relief was to 
provide the Defendant with motivation for making such repairs as the 
State Board found necessary. (The judge made it clear that the Defendant 
need not satisfy the Plaintiffs in this regard.) (T-132.) Although the 
transcript of the court proceedings and the court's minute entry (R-37, 
188) make no such reference, the judgment prepared by counsel for the 
Plaintiffs added the further stipulation that the one month period would 
be "30 days" and would run from the date of the trial (R-224). 
The judgment was signed by the court on February 26, 1982 without 
comment or change, following a hearing on Defendant's objections to 
findings of fact and conclusions of law (R-45, 222). Contrary to the 
statement of facts in the brief of Plaintiffs (Resp. Br. at 7) Defendant 
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contacted Plaintiffs relative to making repairs and was refused the 
opportunity by Plaintiffs to do so. Moreover, the matter of the repairs 
was resolved to the satisfaction of the State Board of Contractors prior 
to the date the judgment was actually signed by the court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiffs, as Respondents, are required under the rules of 
procedure and the law of this jurisdiction to file an appeal or cross-
appeal if they wish modification of the trial court judgment in any 
manner which may enlarge their rights or decrease those of the Defendant. 
Their failure to comply with the rules and law in this regard precludes 
them from any relief from the trial court finding of mutual mistake. In 
any case, the record of the proteedings below clearly establishes that 
the trial court correctly and properly found that the parties' written 
agreement did not reflect their intentions as a result of a mutual 
mistake of fact. 
The Plaintiffs failed to provide any probative evidence at trial 
upon which the trial court could base an award for damages relative 
to the alleged defective workmanship. The trial court's judgment in 
that regard must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of September, 1982. 
JENSEN & LLOYD 
W. Waldan Lloyd 
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 
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Attorney's Address: 
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower 
Number Fifty South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144-0457 
Telephone: (801) 322-2300 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served two (2) ·true and accurate copies of the 
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief upon counsel for the Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, George S. Diumenti, Esq. of and for DIUMENTI, HARWARD 
& NELSON by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to their offices at 
505 South Main Street, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
DATED this 3rd day of September, 1982. 
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